CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 44

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was opposed to any rundown of forces for at least two years, and with the

leader of the Opposition in Malta, Dr. Mintoff, who professed to be glad

to see a full withdrawal of British forces. Hence the present trouble

in Malta following the announcement of our final plans came as no surprise.

The harassment of our forces would no doubt be intensified after the repeal

of the Visiting Forces Act had been enacted in two days' time.

It was

plain that we could not hope to stay in Malta on the basis of the present

planned withdrawal for another four years. Two courses were open to us.

One was the withdrawal of our forces now, using force to the extent

necessary to achieve withdrawal. The alternative was to authorise the

High Commissioner to propose further talks with Dr. Olivier as indicated

by the Defence Secretary; in them we should also discuss the proposed dry dock (for which an excellent naval site already existed) and the possibility of a free port. It was impossible to be certain that the Maltese would

accept a proposal for talks on this basis; but there seemed a good prospect

that they would do so.

In discussion it was recognised that these proposals might set an

embarrassing precedent but it was the general view that on a balance of

our interests our best course was to seek further discussions with

Dr. Olivier on the basis proposed by the Commonwealth and Defence

Secretaries. It was important that these should be put to Dr. Olivier as

talks not primarily about the rephasing of the reduction of our forces but about assisting Melta with the economic consequences.

There was reason

to think that the Malta Government, with the support of the Opposition, was ready to take action in respect of the dockyard (which was at present costing us over million a year). Importance was attached to the dry

dock proposal, which would offer an immediate prospect of constructional

work for 2,000. While the rephasing of the reductions would be a necessary

part of our offer, we should offer no further concession on the defence reduction beyond rephasing within the four year period/we should start the negotiations with a minimum offer. It was noted that the possible range

of adjustments to the present programme for the rundown would cost from

1.2 million to rather more than £3 million over a period of four years.

This compared with the maximum possible saving over the four year period

of £28 million, less £5 million which we had foregone through the rephasing

already offered. In making our offer to Dr. Olivier attention should be

paid to publicity; any public announcement should be made simultaneously

on Malta and the United Kingdom. It was also the general view that in

discussions on the reduction of our forces in other oversea theatres,

it Comme was important to draw the appropriate inferences from the ease of events dn Malta. We should for example start any such negotiations by offering no concessions in respect of our own requirements, and not display our

willingness to make concessions till a later stage.

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